Ralph V. Backman and Mathias C. Tanner v. E. Allen Bateman and Board of Education of Ogden City : Defendant\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Ralph V. Backman and Mathias C. Tanner v. E.
Allen Bateman and Board of Education of Ogden
City : Defendant's Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. R. Callister; John W. Horsley; Attorneys for Defendants;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Backman v. Bateman, No. 8052 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2073
RALPH V. BACKMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E. ALLEN BATEMAN, State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, and 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, 
Defendants. 
MATHIAS C. TANNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E. ALLEN BATEMAN, State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, and 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OG-
DEN CITY, a municipal . ~orporation. 
-~ : · Defendants. 
Case No. 
8052 
Case No. 
8064 
E ... :R. CALLISTER 
' \ Attorney General 
JOHN W. HORSLEY, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ARROW PRUSo aALT LAKr 
/ 
/ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................ 2-4 
STATEMENT OF POINT'S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
ARGUMENT ................................... 4-t 7 
POINT I. THE STATUTE IS A VALID EXER-
CISE OF THE STATE'S POLICE POWER ..... 4-15 
POINT II. THE STATUTE IS APPLICABLE TO 
PLAINTIFFS .............................. 15-17 
POINT III. THE FACT THAT THE OGDEN CITY 
BOARD MEMBERS RECEIVE NO COMPEN- · 
SATION IS WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT IN 
THIS CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
. . J 
CONCLUSION ................................. 17, 18 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
TEXTS 
11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec. 261, p. 997 . . . . 7 
16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 175a . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
58 Am. Jur., p. 540-541 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
CASES 
Atkin v. Kansas (1903) 191 U. S. 207 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Barton v. Alexander, 27 Ida. 286, 148 P. 4 71 . . . . . . . . 11 
Broadbent et al. v. Gibson et al., 105 Utah 53, 140 
P. 2d 439 .................................. . ,- 9 
Holden v. Hardy, 14 Utah 71, affirmed 169 U. S. 366, 
42 L. Ed. 780 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX-Continued 
Page 
Lagoon Jockey Club v. Davis County, 72 Utah 405, 
270 P. 543 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Packer Corporation v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 52 S. Ct. 
~73, 76 L. Ed. 643, 79 A. L. R. 564 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Quattlebaum v. Busbea, 204 Ark. 96, 162 S. W. 2d 44 . 14 
Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 P. 272, 12 A. 
L. R. 552 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920 . . . . . . . . . . 8 
State ex rei McKittrick v. Whittle, ... Mo .... , 63 
S. W. 2d 100, 88 A. L. R. 1099 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
State v. Packer Corporation, 77 Utah 500, 297 P. 1013 7 
State ex rei. Robinson v. Keefe, ... F1a. . .. , 149 So. 
638 ....................................... 14, 15 
State v. School District No. 13 (Mont. 1944), 151 P·. 
2d 168 ..................................... 14, 15 
State v. Sopher, 25 Utah 318, 71 P. 482, 60 L. R. A. 
468 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 91 
L. Ed. 754 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Utah Mfrs. Assn. v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P. 
2d 229 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
STATUTES 
Ch. 3, Title 52, U. C. A. 1953, as amended by Ch. 79, 
Laws of Utah 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
52-3-1, U. C. A. 1953 .......................... 4, 12, 17 
52-3-2, U. C. A. 1953 
52-3-3, U. C. A. 1953 
52-3-4, U. C. A. 1953 
5 
5 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX-Continued 
~ ~~ 
53-2-15, U. C. A. 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
Ariz. Code Annotated 1939, Sec. 54-416 (3) ........ . 
Ark. Statutes 1947 Annotated, Sec. 80-509 (d-a) ... . 
Code of Iowa 1950, Sec. 71.1 
General Statutes of Kansas Annotated 1949, Sec. 
17-1347 .................................... . 
Idaho Code (1947 Ida. Code Commission) Sec. 33-714 
(14) ..................................... ' .. 
Miss. Code 1942 Annotated, Sec. 6302 ............. . 
Missouri Revised Statutes 1949, Sec. 163.080 ....... . 
New Mexico Statutes 1941 Annotated, Sec. 10-110 ... . 
Oklahoma Statutes Annotated 21-481 .............. . 
11 
12 
12 
11 
12 
11 
12 
12 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
RALPH V. BACKMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs .. 
E. ALLEN BATEMAN, State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, and 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, 
Defendants. 
MATHIAS C. TANNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E. ALLEN BATEMAN, State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, and 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OG-
DEN CITY, a municipal corporation. 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8052 
Case No. 
8064 
The two above entitled cases have been consolidated 
by an order of the court for purposes of briefs and oral 
argument. The cases differ in factual detail ; the legal 
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2 
issues, however, are identical, with the exception of one 
additional problem posed in the Tanner case which will be 
the subject of Point III of this brief. 
/ 
Before this brief went to the printers, counsel for 
plaintiffs furnished to counsel for defendants a draft of 
the statement of facts which plaintiffs intended to incorpor-
ate in their brief. The statement was accurate and com-
plete; although many of the details appear not to be es-
sential to a determination of the legal issues in this case. 
Defendants concede the factual accuracy of both the plain-
tiffs' pleadings and the brief, but are in disagreement with 
plaintiffs as to the legal conclusions which follow. In the 
Backman Case, plaintiff is the principal of a Salt Lake 
City High School who was denied re-employment because 
of a ruling by defendant Bateman that such employment 
would be a violation of Utah's "anti-nepotism" statutes 
(Ch. 3, Title 52, U. C. A. 1953, as amended by Ch. 79, 
Laws of Utah 1953), plaintiff being a brother to a mem-
ber of the Salt Lake City Board of Education who is also 
chairman of the Board. In the Tanner Case, plaintiff, a 
teacher of biology, was denied re-employment in the Ogden 
City High School for the reason that his brother was a 
member of the Board. An additional fact in the Tanner 
Case is that the Ogden City Board of Education has here-
tofore resolved, in accordance with statutes giving it that 
power, that the office of board member should be uncom-
pensated. 
The only questions involved i:p. this appeal are whether 
the anti-nepotism statute is constitutional, and if so wheth~ __ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
er its correct construction makes it applicable to these 
plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE STATUTE IS A VALID EXERCISE OF 
THE STATE'S POLICE POWER. 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTE IS APPLICABLE TO PLAIN-
TIFFS. 
POINT III. 
THE FACT THAT THE OGDEN CITY BOARD 
MEMBERS RECEIVE NO COMPENSATION IS 
WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT IN THIS CASE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATUTE IS A VALID EXERCISE OF 
THE STATE'S POLICE POWER. 
The statute in question now reads : 
"52-3-1. It is unlawful for any person holding 
any position the compensation for which is paid out 
of public funds to retain in employment or to em-
ploy, appoint, or vote for the appointment of, his or 
her father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, 
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sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first 
cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, 
sister-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law in or 
to any position or employment, when the salary, 
wages, pay or compensation of such appointee is to 
be paid out of any public funds; and it is unlawful 
for such appointee to accept or to retain such em-
ployment in all cases where the direct power of em-
ployment or appointment to such position is or can 
be exercised by any person within the degrees of 
consanguinity or affinity herein specified, or by a 
board or group of which such person is a member. 
"52-3-2. Each day any such person, father, 
mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, sister, brother, 
uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first cousin, mother-in-
law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-i:Q.-law, son-
in-law, or daughter-in-law, is retained in office by 
any of said officials shall be regarded as a separate 
offense. 
"52-3-3. Any person violating any of the pro-
visions of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
"52-3-4. In towns, this chapter shall not apply 
to the employment of uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces 
or cousins." 
The pleadings of plaintiffs urge that the statute is un-
constitutional. Defendants answer that the statute is a 
valid exercise of the police power inherent in the govern-
ment of this state. 
A recent text has this to say about the nature of the 
police power (16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 175a): 
"The police power is an inherent attribute of 
sovereignty, and exists without any reservation in 
the constitution, being founded on the duty of the 
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state to protect its citizens and provide for the safe-
ty and good order of society. In its nature it is 
broad and comprehensive, and the laws enacted for 
the purpose of regulation thereunder may be im-
politic, harsh, and oppressive without contravening 
the constitutional inhibition. It corresponds to the 
right of self-preservation in the individual, and is an 
essential element in all orderly governments, be-
cause necessary to the proper maintenance of the 
government and the general welfare of the commun-
ity. It comprehends reasonable preventive measures 
no less than the punishment of perpetrated offenses. 
On it depends the security of social order, the life 
and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence 
in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of 
private and social life, and the beneficial use of 
property, and it has been said to be the very founda-
tion on which our social system rests. It has for its 
object the improvement of social and economic con-
ditions affecting the community at large and col-
lectively with a view of bringing about 'the greatest 
good of the greatest number.' It is founded largely 
on. the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, 
an<t also to some extent on that other maxim of 
public policy, Salus populi suprema lex. The con-
stitution presupposes the existence of the police 
power and is to be construed with reference to that 
fa~t, and police regulations presuppose conditions 
which, unless controlled, will operate to a public 
disadvantage." 
Defendants concede, as of course they must, that the 
police power of a state is not without limits. Those limits 
are drawn, so far as this case is concerned, by the due 
process clauses in the federal and state constitutions. With 
respect to the problem of this interrelation between the 
police power and the due process clause the following quo-
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tation is taken from 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec. 
261,p.997: 
"In discussing the relationship between the 
guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
police power of the states, Justice Holmes has point-
ed out: 'We must be cautious about pressing the 
broad words of the Fourteenth Amendment to a 
drily logical extreme. Many laws which it would be 
vain to ask the court to overthrow could be shown, 
easily enough, to transgress a scholastic interpre-
tation of one or another of the great guaranties in 
the Bill of Rights. They more or less limit the lib~ 
erty of the individual, or they diminish property to 
a certain extent. We have few scientifically certain 
criteria of ·legislation, and as it is often difficult to 
mark the line where what is called the police power 
of the states is limited by the Constitution of the 
United States, judges should be slow to read into the 
latter a nolumus mutare as against the lawmaking 
power. (citing Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. 
S. 104, 55 L. Ed. 112, 31 S. Ct. 186, 32 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 1062)". 
Another principle of constitutional law is relevant here. 
Many cases indicate the necessity of judicial restraint in 
adjudicating upon statutes passed under the police power. 
Large discretion is of necessity vested in the legislature in 
determining what measures ought to be passed in further-
ance of the public welfare. Cases written by this courf 
teach that it is not a function of the courts to inquire into 
legislative wisdom. In State v .. Packer Corporation, 77 Utah 
500, 297 P. 1013, the court sustained the validity of a sta-
tute which prohibited the advertisement of cigarettes upon 
billboards. The decision contains this language: 
"It is well settled in this state, and elsewhere, 
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that the courts will not declare a statute unconsti-
tutional unless it clearly and manifestly violates 
some provision of the Constitution of the state or of 
the United States. Every presumption must be in-
dulged in favor of the constitutionality of an act, 
and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its 
validity. Utah State Fair Ass'n. v. Green, 68 Utah 
251, 249 P. 1016. The whole burden lies on him who 
denies the constitutionality of a legislative enact-
ment. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 436, 6 L. Ed. 
678. 
"* * * 'Only in cases, however, where the 
legislature exceeds its powers, will the courts inter 
fere or set up their judgment against that of thb 
legislature. Where the act has a real and. substantial 
relation to the police power, then no matter how un-
reasonable nor how unwise the measure itself may 
be, it is not for the judicial tribunals to avoid or 
vacate it upon constitutional grounds, nor will the 
courts assume to determine whether the measures 
are wise, or the best that might have been adopted; 
or whether such laws are invalid on the ground of 
inexpediency, or whether they bear any real or sub-
stantial relation to the public welfare'." 
The same statute was again before the court with the 
same result, 78 Utah 177, 2 P. 2d 114, and the cases were 
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court "in Packer 
Corporation v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 52 S. Ct. 273, 76 L. Ed. 
643, 79 A. L. R. 564. A more recent case, S~ate v. Mason, 
94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920, upheld the constitutionality of a 
statute which imposed license requirements upon all com-
mission merchants taking possession of farm produce with-
out paying cash. The case contained this thoughtful lan-
guage regarding the relationship of the police power to the 
due process cia use : 
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"It is urged that the act bears no relation to 
public health, morals or the general welfare of the 
State, the implication from the argument being 
that the power of the legislature in an act of this 
sort must fall under such classification. * * * 
What defendant apparently has in mind is that, in 
determining what is or what is not due process as 
it affects the ordinary rights which citizens of all 
orderly governments enjoy, we generally look to 
see whether the legislation which affects or tram-
mels those rights is reasonably related to and de-
signed to protect the health, safety, morals, or pub-
lic welfare of the people or any portion of them. This 
balance between police powers and due process is, 
therefore, more or less in a state of unstable equil-
ibrium, changing with sociological and economic 
developments. As the protection of the due process 
clause recedes, the police power advances. There is 
always articulation between the two." 
Other cases involving the police power are: Utah 
Mfrs.' Assn. v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 229; Broad-
bent et al. v. Gibson et al., 105 Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 439, 
Holden v. Hardy, 14 Utah 71, affirmed 169 U. S. 366, 42 
L. Ed. 780. And of course there are many cases based upon 
the well-settled proposition that all presumptions favor con-
stitutionality: Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 P. 272, 
12 A. L. R. 552; State v. Sopher, 25 Utah 318, 71 P. 482, 60 
L. R. A. 468. 
Any state obviously has an immediate concern in the 
employment practices of its own employees. As was said 
by McKenna, J., in Atkin v. Kansas (1903) 191 U. S. 
207: 
"It belongs to the state as the guardian of its 
people and having control of its affairs to prescribe 
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the conditions upon which it will permit public work 
to be done in its behalf, or on behalf of its municipal-
ities." 
Inherent in any government, then, is a broad power 
over its employees. A striking example of the breadth of 
this power is found in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 
330 U. S. 75, 91 L. Ed 754, involving the constitutionality 
of the Hatch Act. That statute forbade employees of the 
executive branch of the federal government from taking 
"any active part in political management or in political 
campaigns." 
Now, interference with the basic political rights of a 
citizen is a grave and severe exercise of governmental power 
-much more so than that involved here. And the wisdom 
of the Hatch Act was and is hotly controversial. Yet the Act 
was upheld. The worker involved, Mr. Poole, was a skilled 
coin roller in aU. S. Mint, and the possibility of his unfair 
use of governmental prestige for political purposes would 
seem remote. In the majority opinion is a footnote (34) 
which is relevant to that case and to the one at bar (91 L. 
Ed., at 772) : 
"When in 1891 New Bedford, Mass., under a 
rule removed a policeman for political activity, an 
opinion by Mr. Justice, then Judge, Holmes disposed 
summarily of McAulliffe's contention that the rule 
invaded his right to express his political opinion with 
the epigram, 'The petitioner may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman.' McAulliffe v. New 
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N. E. 517." 
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Nepotism has widely been regarded as harmful to the 
conduct of an efficient system of public employment. It 
would seem to follow that nepotism is a valid subject upon 
which a state may legislate. One case which so holds is 
Barton v. Alexander, 27 Ida. 286, 148 P. 471, which upheld 
the validity of the Idaho anti-nepotism statute as being a 
valid subject of police action. The Idaho court said: 
"We believe it to be within the legislative power 
to prohibit officers from appointing persons to of-
fice related to them by affinity or consanguinity, in 
the interest of efficiency in public service and for 
the best interests of the people and of the municipal 
subdivisions of the state, and as a legitimate police 
regulation in regard to which the lawmaking power 
may legislate, and reasonable legislation in regard 
thereto is constitutional and enforceable. Nepotism 
is recognized as an evil that ought to be eradicated 
and stamped out, and we know of nothing in the 
state constitution that prohibits the legislature from 
passing reasonable regulations in regard thereto." 
Anti-nepotism statutes have a firm basis, therefore, 
in the sovereign police power of the state.· Many states have 
statutes prohibiting nepotism in school district employment 
practices. Examples of these statutes are: 
Ariz. Code Annotated 19B9, Sec. 54-416 (3) ; 
General Statutes of Kansas Annotated 1949, 
Sec. 17-1347; 
Miss. Code 1942 Annotated, Sec. 6302; 
Oklahoma Statutes Annotated 21-481. 
In Arkansas there is a provision that one cannot be 
appointed as a teacher if he is related to a board member 
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unless the teacher is elected by petition of 507o of the pat-
rons of the school involved. 
Ark. Statutes 1947 Annotated, Sec. 80-509 (d-a). 
In some states, school teachers are expressly excepted 
from the operation of the state's nepotism law: 
Code of Iowa 1950, Sec. 71.1; 
New Mexico Statutes 1941 Annotated, Sec. 10.:. 
110. 
In other states the employment of a teacher related to 
a board member may validly be affected if the board mem-
ber disqualifies himself from participation in the vote. 
Idaho Code (1947 Ida. Code Commission) Sec. 
33-714 (14) ; 
Missouri Revised Statutes 1949, Sec. 163.080. 
The above list of statutes does not purport to be com-
plete. Indexing of nepotism statutes in the various code 
compilations is not standardized. The reason for citing the 
statutes is to show that the practice of nepotism in school 
districts is a subject upon which the legislatures of several 
states have seen fit to act. 
It has been shown above that the practice of nepotism 
in schools is one which the .legislature may suppress. The 
constitutional question of this lawsuit- is whether this par-
ticular statute could resasonably have been considered by 
the legislature as tending to accomplish its purpose. 
An Anti-nepotism statute has been on the Utah statute 
boo~s since 1931. For over 20 years the statute read: 
\ 
"52-3-1. It is unlawful for any executive, legis-
lative, ministerial or judicial officer of this state or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
any of its political subdivisions to retain in employ-
ment or to employ, appoint, or vote for the appoint~ 
ment of, his or her father, mother, husband, wife 
son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew' 
niece, first cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law' 
brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law, or daugh~ 
ter-in-law, in any department of the state, or of a 
district, county, city or municipal government of 
which such executive, legislative, ministerial or 
judicial officer is a member, when the salary, wages, 
pay or compensation of such appointee is to be paid 
out of any public funds." 
This prior statute has no effect where the hiring power 
was in a board since under it the board could employ a rela~ 
tive of any board member, the board member simply re-
fraining from any participation in the vote necessary to 
affect the hiring. The rather wide extent to which this 
practice has been indulged in school district employment 
policies is disclosed by the pleadings. The same practices 
are available to city councils and county commissioners. 
Evidently a majority of the members of the 30th Legis-
lature decided that, as between board members and em-
ployees, the existence of close blood or marriage ties was 
not desirable. Whether or not this legislative decision was 
a wise one does not of course have anything to do with these 
lawsuits. The only question is whether the decision which 
the legislators made could have been reached on any rational 
basis. 
There are well known factors upon which the legisla-
ture may have based this conclusion. Some of th€se factors 
are: (1) As between two co-workers, one of whom is re-
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lated to a board member, frictions and jealousies are more 
likely. There may exist suspicion, justifiable or not, of 
some minor preference or advancement in any one of hund-
reds of ways; (2) public employment, being as it is a matter 
of public concern, necessarily draws public comment. There 
is plainly a greater likelihood of public criticism and lack 
of public confidence in a system honeyco:r;nbed with rela-
tives working for relatives. The above are only suggested 
as factors which the legislature validly may have considered. 
Other such factors may, and doubtless to exist and also were 
considered. This brief is not concerned with a defense of 
the wisdom of the recent amendment. Wise or not, the law 
was put upon our statute books by the department of our 
' government to which the duty of writing laws is delegated 
by our constitution. Plaintiffs ask that this court set aside · 
that policy determination. They ask, in effect, a repeal of 
the statute. 
The only case upon which plaintiffs can place reliance 
. for their contention that the statute is unconstitutional is 
the Florida case of State ex rel Robinson v. Keefe, ... Fla . 
. . . J 149 So. 638. That case held quite correctly that the 
Florida anti-nepotism statute plainly did not, in terms, 
cover the employment of school teachers. The case goes on 
to imply, however, by a dictum that had the statute been 
intended to apply to school teachers it would have been 
unconstitutional. The dictum is, we think, not correct for 
the reasons outlined above. There are many decisions which 
have concerned themselves with nepotism statutes as ap-
plied to school teachers. See Quattlebaum v. Busbea, 204 
Ark. 96, 162 S. W. 2d 44; State v. _School District No. 13 
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(Mont. 1944), 151 P. 2d 168; State ex rel. McKittrick v. 
Whittle, ... Mo .... , 63 S. W. 2d 100, 88 A. L. R. 1099. 
In none of these cases is the question squarely presented 
whether nepotism laws constitutionally can be applied to 
school teachers. Implicit in each case, however, is the as-
sumption that the court is d~aling with a valid law. 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTE IS APPLICABLE TO PLAIN-
TIFFS. 
By their pleadings, plaintiffs contend that the lan-
guage of the statute does not include employment such as 
theirs. 
It seems plain that it does. The statute, by its own 
terms, covers any employment compensated out of public 
funds. The money which goes to pay school teachers' sal-
aries is money raised by taxation, which comes within the 
category of public funds. Plaintiffs doubtless will cite the 
Florida case, State ex rel Robinson v. Keefe, ... Fla .... , 
149 So. 638, as an instance in wp.ich the nepotism statute 
was held not to apply to school teachers. That case held 
that the Florida statute did not cover school teachers. The 
language of the statute there construed read as follows : 
"Section 1. That any officer, member of state 
board, county officer, member of county board or 
commission, city official, or his appointee, who shall 
knowingly employ either directly or indirectly any 
person related within the fourth degree, either by 
consanguinity or affinity to such state officer, mem-
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ber of state board, county officer, member of county 
board or commission, city official or his appointee, 
shall be deemed guilty of misfeasance and malfeas-
ance in office and subject to removal therefor. Pro-
vided however that the provisions of this Act shall 
not apply to officers above who employ only one per-
son related to him as above set out. 
School teachers and school principals simply do not 
come within that language, and that is all the case holds. 
It is plain that the Florida legislature did not contemplate 
any effect upon the employment of school teachers; it is 
equally plain that the Utah legislature had such an inten-
tion. 
Plaintiffs plead that the anti-nepotism statute is con-
tradictory to Sec. 53-2-15, U. C. A. 1953, which provides 
that a certificate issued by the State Board of Education is 
valid in any school district. 
This argument is not sound. If inconsistency indeed 
exists; and if the two statutes cannot possibly be harmon-
ized, the recent anti-nepotism amendment, being later in 
time, prevails. 58 Am. Jur., p. 540-541. The more obvious 
answer, of course, is that there is not the slightest incon-
sistency. That fact that a teacher cannot lawfully be em-
ployed by a given school district does not make invalid his 
teaching certificate, even in that district. His certificate is 
valid. Certification by the state board is no guarantee of 
\ 
a job in any district a certified teacher might decide to offer 
his services to. If there is any interpretation by which two 
statutes can both operate, that is the one the courts will 
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follow. Lagoon Jo,ckey Club v. Davis County, 72 Utah 405, 
270 P. 543. 
POINT III. 
THE FACT THAT THE OGDEN CITY BOARD 
MEMBERS RECEIVE NO COMPENSATION IS 
WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT IN THIS CASE. 
In this Point is considered the question whether the 
fact that the members of the Ogden City Board of Education 
are not compensated is of any materiality. The defendants 
submit that the plain wording of the statute demonstrates 
that this does not matter. The only question along that line 
is whether the teacher (plaintiff Tanner) is compensated 
out of public funds. The case is very clearly covered by the 
second clause of Sec. 52-3-1, U. C. A. 1953, as amended. 
The construction of the statute which defendants submit is 
the only reasonable construction is : 
"* * * ; and it is unlawful for such appointee 
to accept * * * such employment [i. e., any 
that is compensated out of public funds] in all cases 
where the direct power of employment to such posi-
tion is or can be exercised by any person within the 
degrees of consanguinity or affinity herein specified, 
or by a board or group of which such person is a 
member. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants urge that the statute here under attack is 
well within the police power possessed by the legislature. 
The statute, by its express terms, squarely covers the fac-
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tual situations presented by the cases of these plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' suit is but an appeal to this court to do what 
this court cannot do--repeal a statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
JOHN W. HORSLEY, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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